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Chapter 1 - Introduction 
 
The first chapter presents the background to the problem discussed and analyzed in the 
thesis. The problem is concretized into a research question, which is the question that 
aims to fulfill the purpose of the study. Delimitations of this study are discussed last in 
this chapter.     
 
1.1 Background 
 
Information is a key resource in financial markets, asset and firm specific information is a 
vital resource which enables market participants to assess value of financial assets. 
However, it is not controversial that different market participants have access to different 
asset specific information. A private investor, investing in corporate stock in hope of 
increasing his wealth does not have the same information as corporate analyst. The 
private investor often relies on his own estimation of firm value or on valuation 
performed by some other party. Corporate analyst on the other hand can discuss company 
performance with firm´s management and has access to advanced databases that facilitate 
assessment of firm value. But despite that, an analyst does not have access to new daily 
information known by persons even more closely related to corporation. These persons, 
broadly defined as insiders, take decisions that affect firm value. Even if the insiders do 
not take the decisions, they can get immediate information about corporate actions due to 
their position in the firm. Information known by insiders is referred to as insider 
information. People might associate insider information with something illegal, yet 
possession of insider information is not illegal per se but rather is a consequence of 
persons´ employment in corporation.  
According to Swedish Financial Supervisory Authority, insiders are persons who 
are very likely to have access to insider information about the company due to their 
position in the firm (Finansinspektionen , 2011). The essence of this definition is that due 
to insiders’ closer involvement in the business they have advantage of knowing 
information that is not publically available. Knowing more or more precise information is 
undoubtedly advantageous in assessing asset value. It is thus not surprising that investors 
thoroughly follow transactions made by the insiders. In particular, investors follow stock 
transactions made by insiders to derive the informational content of a transaction and 
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predict company’s future performance. Some investment funds base their whole 
investment strategy on following insider transactions with the anticipation of utilizing 
mispricing in stock markets. New technology enables investors to follow transactions 
made by the insiders. Databases like Swedish Financial Supervisory Authority´s database 
with insider transactions and analogous Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) 
EDGAR database in United States, provide information about all insider transactions 
given the transaction is properly reported to supervisory authority. Although this 
information is not provided instantaneously after the insider transactions, many investors 
use this information to interpret firm´s long term potential and predict stock price 
movement.  
 The databases have introduced a research area that studies whether insiders use 
insider information to generate returns in excess of “normal” returns. Returns in excess 
of/below “normal” returns are referred to as positive/negative abnormal returns (hereafter 
the term abnormal returns will be used throughout the paper). Focus of the studies is to 
analyze whether stock buy and sell transactions are made by insiders in order to gain 
positive abnormal returns or avoid negative abnormal returns. However databases 
generally also contain information about other insider transactions (option exercises, 
participation in new shares issue, share transfers etc.), which have broadened the research 
area.  
 
1.2 Problem discussion 
 
According to Fama (1970), market prices of financial assets should reflect all the 
available information about the assets. The theory is known as the efficient-market 
hypothesis (Fama 1970) and has been heavily debated since its origin for roughly 30 
years ago. The core implication of the efficient-market hypothesis in its strongest form is 
that all available information about an asset, including information known by insiders, is 
incorporated in its price. Consequently, insiders should not be able to generate abnormal 
returns. A considerable amount of studies have come up with results that contradict the 
efficient-market hypothesis (Seyhun (1986 & 1988), Lakonishok & Lee (2001), Iqbal & 
Shetty (2002), Del Brio, Miguel, & Perote (2002), Jeng, Metrick, & Zeckhauser (2003), 
Hotson, Singh, & Kaur (2008)), i.e. that insiders are able to make abnormal returns by 
using insider information. These studies are mainly focusing on the relationship between 
insiders trading of company stock and consequent stock performance. After revelation of 
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the fact that insiders can use insider information to generate abnormal returns, the focus 
of the studies has expanded to examining whether outsiders can mimic their actions and 
make similar returns. A good example of the latter is a study by Seyhun (1986).  
Another extension of the study field was enabled following development of 
nontraditional compensation methods to corporate managers. One of such developments 
is the increased usage of stock options as a part of directors´ compensation package, 
which increased rapidly in 1990s (Bryan, Hwang, & Lilien, 2000). Usage of stock options 
motivates directors to increase market value of the stock price, which aligns goals of 
directors with those of shareholders. Research shows that companies with more growth 
opportunities are using stock options to higher extent, compared with mature companies 
in mature industries (Gaver & Gaver (1993), Smith Jr. & Watts (1992)). Stock options 
provide all the benefits of the upside movement in the stock price and at the same time 
protection from the downside, which creates incentives to take on risky growth 
opportunities to possibly increase the value of the firm. Suitability of the stock options as 
a part of incentive program is a widely discussed topic, however this topic is beyond the 
scope of this paper. Data about insiders’ exercise of stock options enables researchers to 
test the relationship between exercise of the stock options and consequent stock 
performance. There should be no doubt that the exercise of stock options can contain 
valuable information about the company and anticipated stock performance (Tavakoli, 
Mcknight, & McMillian, 2011). Insiders’ timing of option exercise can be compared to 
their choice of buying/selling the stock of their company on the basis of insider 
information. Recent research shows evidence for usage of insider information to time the 
exercise of stock options (Carpenter & Remmers (2001), Abody, Hughes, Liu, & Su 
(2008)), thus suggesting that all information about a security is not incorporated in the 
stock price as proposed by the efficient-market hypothesis.  
Relationship  between pure stock sell and buy transactions by insiders has been 
widely studied in different contexts (brief review of previous studies is presented in 
Chapter 2). In the context of Swedish stock market the subject has been a recurring topic 
in academical theses. Relationship between option exercises by insiders and consequent 
stock performance has not been as widley studied, with few studies based on US data. 
This topic has not been explored in the context of Swedish stock market. This study aims 
to fill that research area by analyzing whether insiders use insider information when 
exercising the options and accordingly avoid wealth decrease. Examining this relationship 
will give a more complete picture of insiders´ usage of insider information.  
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1.3 Purpose and Research Question 
 
The purpose of this thesis is to broaden the research field and contribute with a new 
perspective regarding insider trading and insiders’ ability to avoid negative abnormal 
returns. In order to accomplish this purpose, the study aims to answer the following 
research question:  
Do Swedish insiders use insider information to avoid wealth decrease? 
 
 1.4 Delimitations 
 
The thesis is delimited in following aspects: 
 The study focuses solely on insiders’ ability to avoid abnormal returns, no 
attempt is made to quantify possible gains for outside investors  
 Study is performed on transactions between calendar years 2000 and 2010 
 Firms included in the study are or have been listed on Swedish stock exchange 
 Transaction costs are not taken into consideration 
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1.5 Thesis outline  
 
Chapter 2 presents previous relevant studies, both international and Swedish, regarding 
insider trading and insiders ability to utilize informational advantage. The chapter ends 
with a discussion about previous research and its relevance for this study.  
 
 
Chapter 3 outlines the theoretical framework for this study and questions its robustness. 
 
 
Chapter 4 presents Swedish insider legislation.    
 
 
Chapter 5 presents the methodology approach used in this study. The hypothesis is 
formulated and the event study process is described in detail. The end of this chapter 
discusses reliability and validity of the study. Criticism of method and sources used in the 
study concludes the chapter.  
 
 
Chapter 6 reports combined empirical result and analysis of the results. 
 
 
Chapter 7 concludes the study and suggests topics for future research.  
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Chapter 2 - Previous research 
 
In the second chapter previous relevant studies are reviewed, this firstly to position the 
study and secondly to provide an overall picture of a widely researched topic. Both 
international and Swedish, which is the market analyzed in this study, studies are 
reviewed. 
 
2.1 International studies 
 
Previous international studies trying to find out whether insiders use insider information 
to make abnormal returns have produced various conclusions. Only limited number of 
conclusions from international and Swedish studies is summarized to highlight the depth 
of the subject and broaden reader’s perspective.  
Seyhun (1986) find that insiders can predict future stock price movements of 
individual firm and thereby generate abnormal profits. Study is performed using US data 
on insider transactions between year 1975 and 1981. Another conclusion of the study is 
that higher ranked insiders (chairman of the boards and officer directors), who are more 
knowledgeable about firm´s future prospects, are better at predicting future stock 
performance. Seyhun (1988) confirms the results on aggregate level using same sample as 
in the study performed in 1986. Increased aggregate buying of stock by insiders is highly 
correlated with following increase in stock price. Contrary relationship of increasing 
aggregate sale of stock and consequent decrease in stock price is also found to be 
statistically significant.  
Insider´s ability to earn abnormal returns is refuted by Eckbo & Smith (1998) in 
their study on the Oslo Stock Exchange for insider transactions between 1985 and 1992. 
The authors are able to replicate findings of Seyhun (1986) when using simple event 
study approach. However there is no evidence of insiders making abnormal returns when 
the model is extended to capture change in firm specfic risk over time.  
 Lakonishok & Lee (2001) show that sale transactions by insiders have marginal 
effect on consequent stock performance, while buy transactions are associated with 
higher abnormal returns. The study is performed on US data covering time period from 
1975 to 1995. One explanation to low abnormal returns following sale transactions is that 
during the studied time period, the usage of stock options as a compensation method 
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increased rapidly. Consequently, more insider wealth was tied to one firm which 
increased need for diversification. This is proven by increasing selling activity during the 
studied time period.  
Iqbal & Shetty (2002) investigate stock price reaction after high concentration of 
insider trades. They come to a conclusion that stock performance determines insiders’ 
actions i.e. insiders purchase the stock after a decrease in stock price and sell the stock 
after stock price increases. Implication of this causality is that insiders may actually have 
informational advantage but they are not exploiting it to generate abnormal returns by 
timing buy transactions before stock price increase and selling stock before stock price 
decrease.  
Del Brio et al. (2002) perform study on Spanish stock market, investigating 
whether insiders are able to generate abnormal returns. Study shows that insiders are 
indeed able to make abnormal profits by trading stock of their own company, however 
outside investors´ ability to mimic insiders and make similar profits is limited. Outside 
investors in the Spanish market are only able to earn abnormal return on specific days. 
The market then adjusts for these gains and the study does not show any significant 
cumulative abnormal return for the whole holding period. 
Hotson et al. (2008) investigate insider trades by directors in listed corporations on 
Australian stock market during three month period in 2005. Results show that directors 
time their stock transactions to exploit mispricings in the market by selling stock prior to 
decrease and purchase prior to increase in stock price. In particular, directors in small 
companies generate higher abnormal returns than directors in large corporations. Another 
conclusion of the study is that sale transactions are associated with higher abnormal 
returns than buy transactions, which contradicts the results of Lakonishok & Lee (2001). 
 Data about insiders´ option exercise transactions has also been used to perform 
studies concerning insider information and insiders’ ability to utilize the information to 
generate abnormal profits. Carpenter & Remmers (2001) perform study using US data for 
time period from 1984 to 1995. Prior to 1991 insiders in US listed corporations were 
prohibited from selling the stock acquired from option exercise within six months from 
exercise occasion. Carpenter & Remmers (2001) show that during this period, insiders 
exercised their options before periods with significant positive abnormal returns, 
suggesting that insiders time their exercise transactions to experience wealth appreciation 
by holding stock of their company. For the period after 1991, researchers anticipated to 
detect abnormal returns after exercise occasion, since insiders were permitted to sell 
shares immediately. However this relationship is not found to be significant for full 
8 
 
sample. Only for managers in small corporations, exercise date was followed by a period 
with negative abnormal returns, suggesting that insiders in small corporations time their 
option exercise to avoid negative abnormal returns. The fact that it applied on managers 
in smaller firms is in line with findings of Hotson et al.  (2008) and Lakonishok & Lee 
(2001) who show that the market is better at incorporating information regarding larger 
firms compared with smaller firms, accordingly insiders in smaller firms have higher 
ability to earn abnormal returns.  
Huddart & Lang (2003) use a somewhat different approach; they study option 
exercise patterns among 50 000 employees at seven US companies. They differ between 
periods with high respectively low option exercise activity and study stock performance 
after these periods. Researchers find that periods with low exercise activity is followed by 
a six month period where stock returns are 10% lower than during six months following 
period with high exercise activity. Conclusion of the study is that insiders can predict 
times when stock will underperform so they exercise their options and sell the obtained 
shares before the drop in stock price.   
Abody et al. (2008) analyze stock option exercises in US during 1996 – 2003 and 
find that option exercises that were followed by immediate sale of the stock were 
associated with abnormal future negative returns and those exercises followed by a hold 
of the shares were associated with positive future abnormal returns. Evidence for the 
former relationship (i.e. immediate sale of shares is associated with negative abnormal 
returns) is found to be weaker than the latter relationship (i.e. hold of shares is associated 
with positive abnormal returns).  
 
2.2 Swedish studies 
 
To our knowledge there are no Swedish published studies that investigate insiders’ 
transactions on the Swedish Stock Exchange. However the subject is a popular research 
topic in master theses at Swedish universities.  
Sjöholm & Skoog (2006) perform their study on Swedish listed corporations for 
period between 1991 and 2004. The study concludes that sale transactions result in higher 
abnormal returns compared to buy transactions implying that the sale transactions have 
higher informative value for an outsider. Widlund & Da Fonseca (2007) investigate if it is 
possible to trade in substitutes to the company of the insider, i.e. similar companies in the 
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same industry. Based on data for years between 2000 and 2005 the study indicates that 
insiders can profit by trading in substitutes, using non-public, industry specific 
information. Li & Nogeman (2008) find some support for sale transactions being 
associated with future negative abnormal returns for years 2004 to 2008. Based on insider 
transactions in different industry sectors the authors conclude that negative abnormal 
returns could be identified after sale transactions in Banking, Oil Gas & Fuel and 
Machinery sectors. More recent study by Alvén & Antbacke (2010) finds that board 
members´ trading patterns have the highest information content, suggesting that 
mimicking the board members´ transactions makes it possible to earn abnormal returns. 
Contrary to Carpenter & Remmers (2001), Alvén & Antbacke (2010) find that trades 
made by chief executive officers (CEO) are least informative.  
 
2.3 Research discussion  
 
From a brief review of previous research it is possible to highlight some similarities as 
well as contradictory findings. Maybe one of the most apparent similarities across 
previous studies is the fact that insiders in smaller corporations seem to have better ability 
to generate abnormal returns. The phenomenon is also given similar explanation, that 
market participants are better at pricing stock of large corporations that provide 
continuous stream of information.  
Another interesting similarity in findings of several studies is that higher-ranked 
managers have greater ability to predict future stock price movements and exploit their 
informational advantage to generate abnormal returns. Undoubtedly, persons responsible 
for taking decisions that affect firm value, have information about these effects before 
lower-ranked managers who are not directly involved in decision making. There seems to 
be an information hierarchy within the corporation which can be compared to different 
access to information between insiders and investors. 
The international studies presented above, span over a time period from 1975 to 
2005. Despite that, the results seem to be consistent over time, although one would expect 
that technological improvements enable processing of more information at higher speed 
and less severe mispricing due to fast information update. Studies are also consistent 
across markets, with an exception of study performed on Norwegian stock exchange 
(Eckbo & Smith, 1998). Majority of the studies are performed on US data, which is not 
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surprising since US SEC provides comprehensive database with insider filings and 
amount of transactions by insiders is considerably larger than in other countries.   
The most salient finding among reviewed studies is the result of Eckbo & Smith 
(1998) study on Oslo stock exchange. By improved method that more closely reflects 
insider transactions, abnormal returns are proved to be insignificant. These findings must 
of course be taken into consideration when evaluating actual returns to insiders from their 
transactions with company stock.  
The research focusing on stock option transactions show results that are similar to 
studies analyzing pure share buy and sale transactions. This implies that informational 
advantage can be used to time option exercise and consequent sale transaction of the 
stock. The similarities in findings of both option transaction and stock transaction studies 
enable us to draw a parallel between these two security types regarding their 
informational content. Although these securities (options and stocks) are very different in 
practice, they might convey the same information about managers’ belief of company´s 
future prospects and impact on firm value. 
Generally, findings of the Swedish studies are supporting the idea that insider 
transactions convey information that can be used to predict future stock performance. Buy 
transactions are concluded to be more informative than sale transactions implying that 
insiders use the information to generate positive abnormal returns rather than avoid 
negative abnormal returns.  
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Chapter 3 - Theoretical framework 
 
The third chapter consists of theories relevant for the study, which in turn is the 
foundation for the analysis. The theories discussed are the efficient market hypothesis, 
information asymmetry and signalling theory. The efficient market is core issue of this 
thesis, therefore the robustness of the hypothesis is discussed more in detail.  
 
3.1 Efficient market hypothesis 
 
According to Fama (1970) a market is considered to be efficient when all relevant 
information is incorporated in the price of a given security. In an ideal market, investors 
should be able to allocate resources based on the securities´ prices due to the fact that the 
prices fully reflect all available information. The efficiency of markets is dependent on 
certain criteria, namely:  
(i) trading securities should be costless  
(ii) all information should be available 
(iii) investors should act rationally  
The above market criteria are to some degree fulfilled on all markets, instead it is the 
extent to which they are satisfied that will affect the market efficiency. Obviously, market 
participants are capable of affecting all three criteria. In practice, the regulatory bodies 
take active steps to satisfy the second criteria (ii), that all information should be available. 
Regulators set up common rules regarding information availability, which should be seen 
as an attempt to enhance market efficiency. Regarding the transaction cost condition (i), it 
is not a secret that trading financial instruments is not costless. However not all market 
participants are affected by the costs to same extent. This is one of the explanations to 
why insider transactions that seem to be generating abnormal profits cannot be replicated 
by outsiders with the same result (Seyhun, 1986). Higher transaction costs for outsiders 
eliminate possibilities to generate abnormal returns by following market participants that 
meet lower transaction costs. The third (iii) market condition is widely debated subject. 
Investors do not seem to behave rationally in all cases. This fact is often given behavioral 
explanation (Tversky & Kahneman (1986), Daniel, Hirshleifer, & Subrahmanyam (1998), 
Gervais & Odean (2001)) that points out biases and heuristics as factors contributing to 
irrationality.          
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Market efficiency is subdivided into three categories:  
(i) weak-form efficiency  
(ii) semi-strong-form efficiency  
(iii)  strong-form efficiency  
The purpose of categorization is to pinpoint on which level the efficient market 
hypothesis does not hold. Fama (1970), states that in a weak-form efficient market (i) the 
prices of securities solely reflect historical information. Accordingly, past behavior of 
prices cannot be used to predict the future price movements and as a consequence, 
technical analysis cannot be used to generate returns that are above the expected returns. 
In weak-form efficient market investors can instead benefit from exploiting insider 
information or apply fundamental analysis.  
 The second subdivision of market efficiency according to Fama (1970) is the 
semi-strong form (ii). In order to determine if a market is semi-strong, the primary 
objective for analysis is market´s ability to incorporate all publicly available information. 
Information is relevant if it is assumed that announcement of the information will affect 
the stock price. Examples of such events could be new information about stock splits, 
earnings announcements or announcement about upcoming dividend levels. If the market 
adjusts itself adequately to new publicly available information, the market is considered 
to be semi-strong efficient. Additionally, investors can only benefit from trading on the 
basis of insider information since it is not publicly available.  
 The strong-form efficiency (iii) emphasizes that all available information should 
be reflected in the price of a security (Fama, 1970). Accordingly, no party in the market 
possesses monopolistic information that can be used for beneficial trading. Thus insiders 
should not be able to earn abnormal returns by trading based on non-publicly available 
insider information.  
 
3.2 Robustness of efficient market hypothesis 
 
The following discussion about efficient market hypothesis is only a short summary of 
research that not in any way tries to review the enormous amount of research that has 
been done. Any attempt to summarize the comprehensive research about market 
efficiency would inevitably lead to shift of our thesis focus. For more deep discussion on 
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past research see Fama (1991), Beechey, Gruen, & Vickery (2000), Malkiel (2003), 
Sewell (2011).  
 The hypothesis suggesting that markets show weak-form efficiency is a widely 
researched area. Dating back to 1960s, studies by Fama (1965) and Fisher (1966) provide 
evidence for the fact that stock prices can be predicted (in short term) based on historical 
price movements.  In 1990s considerable amount of studies have explored the possibility 
to use technical analysis to generate abnormal results. Several studies (Brock, 
Lakonishok, & LeBaron (1992), Sullivan, Timmermann, & White (1999), Goldbaum 
(1999)) find that technical trading rules can generate excess returns. Allen & Karjalainen 
(1999) show that when including transaction costs, the excess returns are eliminated and 
not significantly abnormal.   
 Semi-strong market efficiency conditions that all new and relevant public 
information is incorporated into price of a security (Fama, 1970). Research of whether the 
information is efficiently incorporated into stock price has been carried out by using event 
studies, pioneered by Fama, Fisher, Jensen, & Roll (1969). Since the first introduction of 
the event studies the research has been carried out on practically every corporate event, or 
to put it in words of Fama (1991 p. 1599): “We had no clue that event studies would 
become a research industry”. The aim of this study is not to go through findings of all the 
event studies that have been carried out, however the general implication is that prices do 
adjust for new information. Some contradiction to the fact is the finding that stock prices 
do not adjust instantaneously to new information, but rather show a drift towards new 
equilibrium (Chan, Jagadeesh, & Lakonishok (1996), Fama (1998), Griffin, Kelly, & 
Nardari (2010)). For comprehensive list of event studies and their results see Fama (1991) 
and Sewell (2011). 
Proposition that markets show strong-form efficiency is the core issue of this 
thesis. Belief that all information (including insider information) is incorporated in the 
price of a security is controversial, not least due to fact that large amount of studies are 
able to show that insiders can exploit their informational advantage to generate abnormal 
returns. Studies rejecting the hypothesis that markets are strong-form efficient date back 
to 1960s. Neiderhoffer & Osborne (1966) show that market dealers on NYSE used insider 
information about order book to generate abnormal returns. Some more recent studies and 
their findings are discussed in Chapter 2 and the reader is referred to this chapter for 
empirical findings on strong-form efficiency in financial market. 
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3.3 Information asymmetry 
 
The concept of asymmetric information, exemplified by Akerlof (1970), can to some 
extent explain the consisting inefficiencies in capital markets. The idea of information 
asymmetry suggests that different parties in the marketplace have different information, 
where some parties have more information than others. This imbalance of information 
creates opportunities for one party to exploit his informational advantage. 
Insiders have naturally access to new company specific information before the 
outsiders. Moreover, the insiders can see firm performance on asset level, while outsiders 
have to rely on aggregated numbers presented in financial statements. This informational 
advantage can make it possible for an insider to generate abnormal returns. One of the 
possibilities is to buy the company stock before an anticipated increase in the stock price. 
If insider knows that information that will be released to the public will result in an 
increase in stock price, then he or she can utilize this informational advantage by buying 
the stock before information is released and the stock price is then revalued to higher 
level. On the contrary, if insider knows that the firms’ future prospects are bad and will 
conesequently result in lower stock price when the information about it is released, then 
he or she can utilize this information by selling current stock holdings and avoiding 
wealth decrease that is caused by reevaluation of the stock to a lower level (Frankel & Li, 
2004).    
The concept of asymmetric information between insiders and outsiders can be 
further exemplified with a study performed by Aboody & Lev (2000). The study is 
implemented using information about insider transactions in US listed corporations 
between 1985 and 1997. The study concludes that insiders in research and development 
(R&D) intensive companies generate higher abnormal returns than insiders in firms not 
engaged in R&D. Because R&D process is not observable by outsiders and cannot be 
summarized in one number, the insiders can use their knowledge about ongoing R&D 
process to predict future stock performance and generate abnormal returns. The abnormal 
returns occur when market adjusts the stock price based on information about outcome of 
the R&D. But by that time, insiders are already aware of how disclosure about R&D 
affects the stock price, thus making it possible to take actions before information is 
disclosed. 
The imbalance of information and exploiting of informational advantage can 
rapidly decrease confidence in financial markets which is one of the reasons why 
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countries adopt insider regulation. Insider regulation explicitly prohibits usage of 
informational advantage by insiders to exploit other parties (Bris, 2005).   
 
3.4 Signalling hypothesis 
 
A theoretical implication related to asymmetric information is the signalling hypothesis, 
which implies that investors interpret company´s financial decisions as signals of firm´s 
future prospects (Pettit, 2007). Due to information asymmetries in capital markets, 
investors do not only consider financial statements when making investment decision, but 
also try to derive the future prospects of the company by analyzing the decisions taken by 
corporations. One of the more widely studied corporate action and its informational 
content is the dividend announcement by a company (Pettit, 2007), which is assumed to 
convey information about company´s future ability to generate cash flows. But signaling 
hypothesis is also closely related to insider transactions, because outsiders can interpret 
the transaction as a signal of company´s future prospect. Del Brio & de Miguel (2010) 
find that in the context of Spanish market, outsiders are more sensitive to signals from 
insider transactions than signals from dividend announcements.    
Interpretation of signalling hypothesis for insider transaction is that, solely the 
transaction in itself might trigger stock reactions. If outsiders believe that the insider 
transaction conveys information about firm´s future prospects, outsiders can mimic 
insider transaction and thereby affect stock price. This causality is explored by Iqbal & 
Shetty, (2002) who conclude that insider trades are caused by stock performance rather 
than opposite i.e. stock performance is caused by insider transactions. Tavakoli et al. 
(2011) show the opposite causality for specific insider groups. Trades by directors have 
strong effect on future stock performance, while trades by large beneficiaries are to a 
large extent caused by previous stock performance. 
 Although insider transactions can be interpreted as signals of firm´s future 
prospect they are ambiguous signals. Insiders can have several motives to make the actual 
stock transaction. Stock sale transaction can be driven by a need to diversify wealth or 
realize previous gains. If insiders have part of their compensation in stocks, then sale of 
the obtained stock is a natural way to turn compensation into cash holdings. Similarly, a 
stock buy transaction can be a signal of firm´s future prospects but can also be driven by 
increased willingness to align goals of shareholders and management (Iqbal & Shetty, 
2002). 
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Chapter 4 - Legislation 
 
Swedish insider legislation is reviewed in the fourth chapter, to highlight the relevant 
regulations in Swedish financial market. Legislation affects insiders’ ability to exercise 
options and trade company´s stocks which is the empirical foundation of this study. 
 
It is important to highlight that insider trading is not illegal per se and this study does not 
aim to conclude if insiders have acted illegally or not. In fact, Aktas, de Bodt & Oppens, 
(2008) argue that insider trading and databases with information about insider 
transactions enhance market efficiency by providing additional information to outside 
investors. To increase transparency and lower information asymmetry between outside 
investors and insiders, most of the developed countries have adopted insider regulations. 
Countries with soft insider trading regulation may experience limited capital inflow from 
large investors due to lower confidence in the stock market. This can particularly be the 
case for the Swedish stock market due to its relatively small size (Bris, 2005).  
The current Swedish legislation regulating insider transactions was adopted in 2005 
(SFS 2005:377). The legislation is based on directive from European Union on insider 
dealing and market manipulation (market abuse) (2003/6/EC). Transactions with options 
are treated in 5 § in SFS 2005:377, which states that options are allowed to be executed 
on the expiration date if they have value at that time. However the consequent 
transactions with obtained shares are regulated within the framework of 2 §, according to 
which all transactions by insiders, based on insider information are illegal and can result 
in a sentence of up to 2 years in prison. Insider information is classified as information 
about not publicly released or publicly known circumstance that is considered to affect 
the price of a financial instrument. 
Our data on insider transactions is from years 2000 to 2010, which implies that the 
first study period (January 2000 - July 2005) was surrounded by earlier regulation. Prior 
version of SFS 2005:377 was adopted in year 2000 (SFS 2000:1086). Regarding 
differences in these two legislation frameworks, the modifications have no impact on our 
study focus. Concerning the option transactions, the earlier law (2000:1086) allowed 
exercise of all options on expiration date, while the recent law (SFS 2005:377) allows 
only exercise of options that have value on expiration date.  
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Law SFS 2000:1087 on notification of certain holdings of financial instruments (authors 
translation) requires that all transactions by insiders must be reported to Swedish 
Financial Supervisory Authority within five days after the transaction occasion (6 §). 
Additionally, 15 § prohibits all insider transactions within 30 days prior to company´s 
earnings announcement.    An insider is defined in 3 § in SFS 2000:1087. Insiders are 
considered to be persons that through their position in the company are very likely to 
possess non-public information. Following persons are considered to be insiders:  
 a member or alternate member of the company's or its parent company's board of 
directors 
 a managing director or deputy managing director of the company or its parent 
company 
 an auditor or deputy auditor of the company or its parent company 
 a partner in a partnership that is the company's parent company, though not a 
limited partner 
 a holder of another senior executive post or qualified function of a permanent 
nature at the company or its parent company,  
 a holder of a senior executive post in a subsidiary if they may normally be 
considered to have access to non-public information which may affect the 
company’s share price  
 larger shareholders who themselves own at least ten per cent of the share capital 
or number of votes for all shares in the company 
 
Persons with an insider position are also obligated to report their closely related parties' 
shareholdings and changes in those holdings in accordance with 5 § SFS 2000:1087.  
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Chapter 5 - Methodology 
 
The methodological approach used in this study is described in the fifth chapter. In order 
to analyze abnormal returns the widely used market model is described. Both the method 
and the sources used in the study are then criticized.   
 
5.1 Hypothesis formulation 
 
Aim of the study is to examine whether insiders on Swedish stock market use insider 
information to avoid wealth decrease. The study uses combined data about insiders´ stock 
option exercise transactions and stock sale transactions. If the insider has insider 
information which indicates that the future stock price will decrease/underperform then 
insider can benefit by exercising the option and selling the underlying stock. This assures 
that the wealth of an insider does not decrease as a consequence of decline in stock price. 
 The underlying assumption for this study is that the sale of shares within one 
month after the stock option exercise date can indicate usage of insider information by an 
insider. If the insider is aware of information that stock will underperform during the 
period following option exercise, then he or she has incentives to sell the shares obtained 
from option exercise. The sale of shares beyond one month is assumed to be caused by 
new information (public or private) and not based on information known by insider prior 
to the option exercise. This is of course a subjective assumption, but by limiting the 
window between option exercise date and sale transaction the probability that new 
information and corporate events cause the sale transaction is reduced. Another reason for 
limiting the time period to one month is that Swedish insider legislation prohibits stock 
sale within one month prior to the earnings announcement. If option expires in the money 
one month prior to the earnings announcement then insider will choose to exercise the 
option but he or she will be unable to sell the obtained stock during a consequent period 
of one month.    
Ability to sell company´s shares can also be limited by company specific policy. 
Firm owners might condition that stock obtained from the option exercise must be kept 
for a certain time. This restriction might be put in place to try to align managements´ 
goals with those of shareholders. Companies with such restrictions are not represented in 
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this study due to limitation of the time period between option exercise and sale 
transaction.        
 Data provided in Swedish Financial Supervisory Authority´s “stock exchange 
information” database does not include information about whether shares sold by insiders 
are the actual shares obtained from the previous option exercise. A simplified assumption 
is made in this study, explicitly, insider chooses to first sell the shares obtained from 
option exercise.  
The discussion above results in following general hypotheses that are tested: 
H0: There are no negative abnormal returns following insider stock sale transaction 
H1: There are negative abnormal returns following insider stock sale transaction 
 
5.2 Research approach 
 
The goal of the study is to test the hypotheses regarding market efficiency in the context 
of Swedish stock market. To test the hypotheses an exclusively quantitative study 
approach is used. Hypotheses’ testing is performed on quantitative data collected from 
secondary sources.  No attempts are made to complement the quantitative data with 
qualitative data from primary sources. The aim is not to develop new theory but rather 
complement current research in market efficiency by using new event focus in a context 
of Swedish stock market.    
 
5.3 Event study 
 
Event study methodology is a widely used approach to measure impact of one particular 
economical event on firm´s value (Fama, 1991). Assumption of rationality in financial 
markets, i.e. market participants rationally incorporate all new available information into 
price of a given security, makes it possible to separate the “normal” performance of a 
security from an event driven increase/decrease in the price of the security (MacKinlay, 
1997). Normal performance is defined as normal return on a security that would occur in 
the absence of the event. Event driven returns are the abnormal returns that occur due to 
the event. In other words, abnormal return is the difference between actual return on a 
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security and normal return that is predicted by a model that defines normal returns. In this 
sense, study of abnormal returns is a combined test of two hypotheses: (i) test of asset 
pricing model and (ii) test for abnormal returns. It is only possible to draw conclusions of 
the study in the context of the equilibrium model used to define normal returns. Finding 
any abnormal returns should ultimately be assigned to market inefficiency i.e. insiders are 
able to exploit insider information and/or effect of a bad model.   
Event studies are usually used to see impact of some particular event, e.g. earnings 
announcement, stock split, merger announcement on firm´s value. In this study approach, 
the same underlying method is used to analyze stock performance following a sale 
transaction made by an insider. An event study requires following eight steps (Seiler, 
2004): 
1. Identification of an event date. 
2. Definition of an event window. 
3. Definition of an estimation window. 
4. Selection of sample of firms. 
5. Calculation of “normal” returns. 
6. Calculation of abnormal returns 
7. Calculation of cumulative abnormal returns. 
8. Determining the statistical significance of abnormal returns and cumulative 
abnormal returns. 
All of the eight steps above are described in the following sections, section 5.3.1 – 5.3.8.  
Graphically the relationship between event date, event window and estimation 
window is illustrated in figure 1. Term τ denotes time index.    
 
 
 
Figure 1. Relationship between event date, estimation window and event window. 
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5.3.1 Event date 
 
The event date (T0) is defined as the date for first stock sale transaction. Swedish 
Financial Supervisory Authority database provides information about both when the 
actual transaction was made by an insider and when the transaction was published on 
their homepage. The date for actual transaction, rather than the publication date is used. 
The study aims to observe the returns for an insider rather than outsider’s ability to mimic 
the insider´s returns, in which case the publication date would be more appropriate event 
date.  
If the same insider made several sale transactions within one month after the option 
exercise date, the first sale transaction is considered as the event date. The period between 
option exercise date and date for first sale transaction (T-1 – T0) can be between 1 and 30 
calendar days. The option exercise transaction in itself is not assumed to be informative, 
thus not affecting the stock price after the exercise transaction. Rather the consequent sale 
transaction is driven by insider information. 
 
5.3.2 Event window 
 
The event window (L2 which stretches between T0 – T1) is divided in three lengths; 5 (T0 
+ 5), 15 (T0 + 15) and 30 (T0 + 30) trading days. The shortest event window is five 
trading days after the first sale transaction to observe stock performance during one 
trading week. Considering that it can take up to five days for transaction to be published 
on Swedish Financial Supervisory Authority´s homepage, abnormal returns during first 
five trading days are not affected by outsiders’ interpretation of sale transaction as being 
bad news. A longer event window of 15 trading days is chosen to observe whether 
outsiders actually interpret the sale transaction as a signal of bad news and sell company´s 
shares, thereby putting downward pressure on stock price. It is assumed that news about 
insiders sale are incorporated into stock price within 10 trading days, thus not affecting 
the remaining 15 days of the longest event window. In this case it is expected that the 
abnormal returns following the first 15 days after event date are lower. The event window 
is limited to maximum of 30 days to avoid noise from other corporate events that would 
affect stock price, thus making it difficult to interpret the results (Armitage, 1995). 
Another reason for limiting the event window to shorter time period is because previous 
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research has shown that analysis of short term abnormal returns and long term abnormal 
returns necessitate different model specification (Fama E. E., 1998).  
 
5.3.3 Estimation window 
 
The estimation window, denoted L2, starts 120 trading days prior to the option exercise 
transaction and ends on the day of option exercise transaction (L-2 – L-1). A choice of 
estimation window of 120 days is based on discussion put forth in articles by MacKinlay 
(1997) and (Peterson, 1989). 120 trading days are considered to be sufficient to determine 
relationship between return on a security and market portfolio. Extending the event 
window for a longer time period can increases the predictive power of return 
determinants, however this introduces a problem of parameters being out of date. As with 
the data for the event date the date when actual option exercise transaction took place is 
used. 
 
5.4 Sample 
 
The initial sample includes all transactions made by insiders in Swedish listed 
corporations between years 2000 and 2010. The data is filtered to only include stock 
option exercise transactions. Transactions where an insider bought, sold or was assigned 
stock options are excluded. Each option exercise transaction is followed up to see if the 
same insider has sold the same stock class within following 30 days. It is not possible to 
determine whether the shares that are sold are the actual shares that were obtained in the 
option exercise transaction, since this is not specified in Swedish Financial Supervisory 
Authority database. In total, 1369 option exercise transactions were made by insiders 
between years 2000 and 2010 (see figure 2). In majority of the cases (935 transactions or 
68%) insiders accumulated the shares for a time period beyond one month. The remaining 
transactions (434 or 32%) include sale of company´s shares within one month after the 
option exercise. These 434 transactions are initially chosen to be included in our study. 
Because several insiders in a corporation made similar transactions (resulting in same 
event date, event window and estimation window) the repeating transactions in the full 
sample are excluded. The adjustment decreased the full sample with 80 transactions 
resulting in total remaining sample of 354 transactions. 
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Figure 2. Option exercise transactions 
Test for abnormal returns and their significance is performed on total sample of 
events as well as subsamples of the events. Motives for partitioning the total sample are 
discussed next. 
 
5.4.2 Subsamples based on firm size 
 
Subdivision by firm size is made in an attempt to capture differences between insiders 
ability to utilize insider information. Previous research examining pure share buy and sell 
transactions (Seyhun (1986), Lakonishok & Lee (2001), Hotson et al.  (2008)) show that 
insiders in smaller corporations generate higher abnormal returns, implying better ability 
to exploit insider information. Similar pattern is recognized in a study on option exercise 
transactions by Carpenter & Remmers (2001), with a conclusion that insiders in smaller 
corporations are better at utilizing their informational advantage. Subdivision of insider 
transactions is based on firm´s market capitalization in accoradance with sections on 
NASDAQ OMX Stockholm:   
Large Cap: firms with market capitalization of above 1 billion euro. 
Mid Cap: firms with market capitalization of 150 – 1000 million euro. 
Small Cap: firms with market capitalization of below 150 million euro.  
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5.4.3 Subsamples based on date 
 
The total sample is partioned by time between option exercise and stock sale transaction. 
The study examines stock performance for events where option exercise transaction and 
first sale transaction is the same date, i.e. insider sold shares the same day as he or she 
received shares from option exercise. The subdivision is made to analyze whether 
immediate sale is associated with more severe stock underperformance. If an insider is 
unsure about future stock performance then he or she does not have to take immediate 
decision to sell shares and is indifferent between waiting for some days between option 
exercise and sale of shares and sale of shares immediately. Immediate sale on the 
contrary can be a sign of strong belief that the stock will underperform and the insider 
takes rapid action to avoid any wealth decrease.  
 
5.4.4 Subsamples based on insider position 
 
Previous research has shown that higher-ranked insiders might have better information 
about firm´s future prospects (Carpenter & Remmers (2001), Seyhun (1986)) and use this 
information to avoid wealth decrease. To see whether higher-ranked insiders are better at 
timing their sale transactions to avoid wealth decrease, the total sample is subdivided into 
two samples. One sample comprises of CEOs, vice CEOs and board members (higher-
ranked insiders) who are directly involved in taking decisions that have an impact on the 
firm value. The other group consists of remaining insiders (lower-ranked insiders) that 
have either non-executive positions in the firm or are classified as insiders due to their 
involvement in subsidiaries to the parent company.  If higher-ranked insiders do have 
superior information compared to other insiders, it is anticipated that abnormal returns for 
these two groups differ.  
 
5.5 Normal returns 
 
There are several models that provide framework for calculation of normal returns. 
MacKinlay (1997) distinguishes between statistical models and economical models. 
Statistical models rely on statistical behaviour of asset returns, while economical models 
consider behaviour of investors and economical relationships as determinants for defining 
25 
 
normal returns. One of the more widely used models that has been tested for its precision 
in context of event studies is the market model (Strong, 1992). The market model has 
been proven to show good precision (Armitage, 1995). Usage of market model is 
motivated by its stronger statistical properties which lead to more powerful statistical 
tests (Beaver, 1981).  However the model has not remained uncritisized and research has 
shown that misspecification of the model can result in unadequate conclusions about 
abnormal returns (Coutts, Mills, & Roberts (1995), Kolari & Pynnönen (2010)).  
Market model is a statistical model based on an assumption that price of a given 
security   has a stable linear relation with return on a market portfolio of securities. The 
strength of the market model is determined by the regression coefficient (R
2
) calculated 
from regression analysis of market and security returns. The higher the regression 
coefficient, the more of variance in security´s returns is explained by variance in market 
portfolio, which consequently empowers statistical significance of abnormal returns. 
Mathematically, the market model is expressed as:    
                      
                     var(    )      
  
Equation (1). Market model 
 
     – period    return on security   
     – period   return on market portfolio  
     – zero mean disturbance term 
Parameters     and    are calculated from the estimation window using equation (2) and 
(3).    (beta) is a measure of security´s sensitivity to performance of market portfolio and 
   (alpha) is the intercept in the regression. Both terms    and     capture the systematic 
component of security that is linearly related to market portfolio (     . Alpha and beta 
are considered to be stable throughout the estimation window. Term     captures the 
unsystematic component that measures abnormal returns in excess of expected returns.  
  ̂  
∑       ̅          ̅  
∑       ̅  
 
Equation (2). Beta estimation 
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  ̂   ̅      ̅  
Equation (3). Alfa estimation 
 ̅  – is the average daily return on a security i during the estimation window (L1) 
 ̅  – is the average daily market return during the estimation window (L1) 
NASDAQ OMX indexes are used as a benchmark for market portfolio, description 
of the indexes is provided in appendix 1. Company with market capitalization of below 
150 million euro is matched with OMX Stockholm Small Cap Price Index. Companies 
with market capitalization of between 150 and 1000 million euro are matched with OMX 
Stockholm Mid Cap Price Index. Companies with market capitalization above 1 billion 
euro are matched with OMX Stockholm 30 Price Index. OMX Stockholm Small Cap and 
Mid Cap indexes were first provided in 2003. For years prior to 2003, Carnegie Sweden 
Small Cap Price Index is used to match the smallest companies, with market 
capitalization below 150 million euro. OMX Stockholm Benchmark Price Index is used 
for calculation of normal and abnormal returns for companies with market capitalization 
above 150 million euro in years 2000 through 2002. Companies´ market value of equity is 
considered when assigning proper index to calculate normal and abnormal returns.  
The returns for both security and benchmark index are calculated as: 
         
    
      
  
Equation (4). Logarithm return 
     – adjusted closing price for security or index on day    
       – adjusted closing price for a security or index on day     (previous 
trading day). 
Logarithm returns are used due to their additive property which is more suitable for 
event studies examining cumulative returns over longer time period (i.e. logarithm return 
of a security in one month is equal to sum of daily logarithm returns during one month). 
Another benefit of using logarithm returns is that they are more likely to be normally 
distributed which is advantageous in performing standard statistical tests (Strong, 1992).   
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5.5.1 Abnormal returns 
 
Abnormal return is defined as the difference between actual return on a security i in time 
period τ and expected return (defined by market model) in period τ (equation 5). 
                        
Equation (5). Definition of abnormal returns 
      – Abnormal return on a security i at time τ. 
     – Actual return on a security i at time τ. 
 (    |  ) – Expected return on a security i at time τ. 
In settings of the market model it is assumed that there is a stable linear relation between 
stock return        and market return       . Using parameters    and    derived from 
estimation window, abnormal returns are calculated for each security i for every day in 
the event window, using equation (6): 
               ̂   ̂       
Equation (6). Abnormal returns 
 
5.5.2 Statistical properties of abnormal returns 
 
To perform statistical tests and ensure significance of abnormal returns, one has to take 
into consideration the statistical properties of abnormal returns and how they change 
when abnormal returns are aggregated across time and securities. Variance of the 
abnormal returns on a security level is calculated using following equation: 
   (     )    ̂  
  
 
  
[  
      ̅ 
  
 ] 
Equation (7). Variance of abnormal returns 
 
Component  ̂  
  is a disturbance term that captures variance in security´s residual returns 
during the estimation period and is calculated using equation (8). The second component 
of equation (7) captures variance in security´s returns due to sampling error in    and   . 
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If estimation window (L1) is very long, the second term approaches zero and variance of 
abnormal returns in the event window is approximated by variance in residual returns 
during the estimation window, as shown in equation (9). To consider sampling error the 
full equation (7) is used to calculate variance in abnormal returns.  
 ̂  
  
 
    
 ∑       
   
        
 ̂   ̂      
  
Equation (8). Variance disturbance term 
 
    (     )    ̂  
  
Equation (9). Variance for long estimation window 
 
5.5.3 Cumulative abnormal returns  
 
To be able to perform statistical tests about significance of abnormal returns the average 
abnormal returns are aggregated for all securities in the sample for each day in the event 
window. Average abnormal returns are calculated using equation (10) and aggregation is 
made using equation (12). Statistical properties of average abnormal returns (equation 11) 
and cumulative average abnormal returns (equation 13) are derived from MacKinlay 
(1997). 
  ̅̅ ̅̅   
 
  
∑     
 
   
 
Equation (10). Average abnormal return 
 
       ̅̅ ̅̅     
 
  
∑   
 
 
   
 
Equation (11). Variance of average abnormal returns 
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   ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅         ∑   ̅̅ ̅̅  
  
    
 
Equation (12). Cumulative average abnormal returns 
 
    (   ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅        )  ∑    
  
    
       
Equation (13). Variance of cumulative average abnormal returns 
τ1 and τ2 denote time index in the estimation window so that T0 < τ1 ≤ τ2 ≤ T1.  
 
5.6 Statistical tests 
 
The cumulative average abnormal returns are used to perform statistical tests to determine 
whether abnormal returns are statistically significant. Following the hypothesis 
formulation (section 5.2) the null and alternative hypotheses tested are: 
H0:    ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  (        = 0 
H1:    ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  (        < 0 
To test the hypotheses Student’s t-test (hereafter t-test) and Wilcoxon signed rank test 
(hereafter Wilcoxon test) are used. In both tests the same null hypothesis and alternative 
hypothesis are tested. P-values for both tests are presented and in addition the samples are 
tested for distribution normality. Description of the statistical tests and their properties are 
presented below. 
 
5.6.1 Normal distribution 
 
Assumption about normal distribution across abnormal returns of securities enables usage 
of t-test to determine significance of abnormal returns. T-test is reliant on underlying 
assumption that the sample is normally distributed (Corrado, 1989). It is however not 
clear whether abnormal returns are normally distributed even in large samples that should 
converge to normality according to central limit theorem (Brown & Warner, 1985).  To 
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avoid misinterpretation of the results, each sample is tested for normality using Shapiro-
Wilk test. Test is performed using SPSS software. The hypotheses tested are: 
H0:    ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  (        > 0,05 Implies that the sample is normally distributed  
H1:    ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  (        < 0,05 Implies that the sample is not normally distributed 
 
5.6.2 Student´s t-test 
 
T-test is a parametric test, well suited for testing samples that are normally distributed 
(Brown & Warner, 1985). However strong reliance on sample distribution normality 
makes t-test unsuitable for testing significance of abnormal returns that are not normally 
distributed. T-test is performed using t-statistics obtained from equation (14) with inputs 
from equations (12) and (13).  
   
   ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅        
√       ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅         
 
Equation (14). T-statistics 
Confidence interval for t-test is 95%. Since the alternative hypothesis is that there are 
negative abnormal returns, one tailed t-test is used. 
 
5.6.3 Wilcoxon signed rank test 
 
Additionally, the hypothesis test is complemented with Wilcoxon signed rank test to 
empower the statistical results in cases when samples are not normally distributed. 
Wilcoxon test is performed on all study samples to strengthen the statistical results. The 
advantage of Wilcoxon test is that it considers both magnitude and the sign of abnormal 
returns. Nonparametric rank based tests have improved robustness of statistical results 
(Kolari & Pynnönen, 2010) and it is not unusual that traditional parametric tests are 
complemented with nonparametric tests to ensure validity of statistical results 
(MacKinlay, 1997). Wilcoxon test is performed using SPSS software to determine 
whether difference between positive and negative cumulative average abnormal returns 
between securities is statistically significant. If normality test rejects H0, that the sample 
31 
 
is normally distributed, the conclusion is based on the results of the Wilcoxon test, since 
it does not assume specific distribution of returns (MacKinlay, 1997). 
 
5.7 Data sources 
 
The main source of data is Swedish Financial Supervisory Authority database with 
insider transactions, which is available on authority’s homepage. Data about all insider 
transactions between year 2000 and 2010 is downloaded from authority´s homepage.  
Data about companies´ stock quotes is retrieved from Thomson Reuters Datastream 
database. To calculate stock returns the daily adjusted closing price is used, which is 
adjusted for dividends and stock splits. Data on quotes of all indexes used in the study is 
retrieved from Thomson Reuters Datastream database. 
 
5.8 Reliability 
 
Event study methodology is a common way to measure the presence of abnormal returns. 
The general process, comprised of 8 steps described in earlier sections, is common across 
most of the event studies. The modifications between different studies appear in choice of 
model that defines “normal” returns and statistical properties of abnormal returns. 
Reliability of the study is enhanced by giving detailed description of choices within event 
study framework. Raw data used in the study is distributed by Thomson Reuters 
Datastream and Swedish Financial Supervisory Authority. The raw data is used to 
calculate inputs for statistical tests and not modified in any way. Calculations are 
performed using Microsoft Office Excel and statistical tests are performed using SPSS 
software. 
   
5.9 Validity 
 
Internal validity of the study is enhanced by limiting time period for measuring abnormal 
returns after the event date. Decreasing the event window increases the probability that 
there is actual causality between sale transaction and consequent stock performance, 
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although noise from other events may still persist. Additionally, research has shown that 
investors are slow at incorporating new information into stock price (Fama, 1998). It is 
thus impossible to prove strong causality between insiders´ sale transaction and negative 
abnormal returns. The study can be complemented with a causality test to increase 
internal validity of the study.  
External validity is considered to be high when results can be applied beyond the 
specific study context (Bryman & Bell, 2005) . This study contributes to research on 
market efficiency in Swedish financial markets. However the results of the study should 
not be seen in isolation but rather as a complement to overall research, that in 
combination gives more generalized picture of market efficiency in Swedish financial 
market. 
 
5.10 Method criticism 
 
Several subjective assumptions are made throughout the study. The choice of event date 
is not obvious and can be discussed. The usual approach in event studies is to choose 
event date and estimation window close to each other to decrease noise from other events 
that might affect stock price. In this study the estimation window and the event date are in 
some cases distant from each other, which can result in misspecification of normal 
returns. Since insiders are prohibited from trading stock one month prior to earnings 
announcement the risk of earnings announcement affecting stock price is eliminated.  
Due to large amount of data and time constraint, no attempt to clean the data for 
extreme events is made. It is common to exclude stocks that show high volatility due to 
firm specific risks. In this study the only conditions for being included in the study are: 
option exercise transaction, stock sale transaction within one calendar month after the 
option exercise transaction and available stock quotes 120 trading days prior to exercise 
transaction and 30 trading days after the sale transaction. 
The market model for determining normal and abnormal returns as presented in 
this study is valid under the condition that event windows across securities do not 
overlap. The pattern of overlapping event windows is called clustering. In this study only 
total clustering, i.e. event date is exactly the same for several insiders in the same firm, is 
eliminated by exclusion of observations from study sample. Kolari & Pynnönen (2010) 
demonstrate that neglecting the clustering effect increases the probability of rejecting the 
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hypothesis of no abnormal returns, the null hypothesis in this study, when it is true. A 
nonparametric test (Wilcoxon signed rank test) is employed to reduce the impact of 
overlapping event windows which create cross-correlation among securities. Kolari & 
Pynnönen (2010) argue that nonparametric tests do decrease the probability of rejecting 
true hypothesis of no abnormal returns, although not completely eliminate the bias of 
clustering effect. 
The study by Eckbo and Smith (1998) shows that different methods for estimating 
abnormal returns generate different results for the same sample. More specifically they 
show that abnormal returns are reduced or insignificant when using time-varying beta 
values, in comparison with constant beta-values. Accordingly this study can only derive 
conclusions based on the results generated by the method approach previously discussed.      
 
5.11 Source Criticism 
 
The articles used in this study are obtained using Lund University article database 
(LibHub). Book sources used as references are part of course literature on master 
programme in strategic and corporate finance at Lund University School of Economics 
and Management. Additional book sources in econometrics and event study methodology 
are retrieved from library at School of Economics and Management. Data sources used in 
this study are described above and are considered to be reliable.   
The purpose of the theoretical sources in this study is to give an overall perspective 
on an extensively discussed topic. In order to do this, only generally accepted studies and 
theories are discussed. The studies and theories are questioned using contradicting 
findings from other studies.  
The methodological part of this study is to a high extent based on article by 
(MacKinlay, 1997). Criticism of method suggested by MacKinlay is based on later 
studies that cite the author and discuss properties of market model for calculating 
abnormal returns.  
The purpose of studies covered in review of previous research is to position this 
study and reduce preconceptions about insider trading. Previous research may not be 
representative for the comprehensive research about market efficiency and insiders’ 
ability to utilize their informational advantage. 
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Chapter 6 - Empirical results and analysis 
 
The empirical results and analysis of the results is reviewed in the sixth chapter. The 
chapter uses previous studies and theories discussed to analyze the findings of this study. 
The result review and the analysis are combined in order to enhance the reasoning in the 
study. The chapter is subdivided into the various subsamples discussed in the 
methodology. 
 
The first part of the result and analysis reviews the findings for the full sample during the 
period 2000-2010, analysis of various subsamples is presented next. Each of the 
subdivision tests the hypotheses outlined in the methodology:  
H0: There are no negative abnormal returns following insider stock sale transaction 
H1: There are negative abnormal returns following insider stock sale transaction 
 
6.1 Full Sample Result 
 
The full sample consists of 118 Swedish firms contributing with 354 transactions during 
the full length period between the years 2000 and 2010. The results for the full sample are 
summarized in table 1. 
Table 1.      ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  Full sample       
      Event window    ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  p value t-statitics p value Wilcoxon Normality test H0 Rejected 
      5 days -0,0100 0,002 0,001 <0,05 Yes 
15 days -0,0296 0,000 0,000 <0,05 Yes 
30 days -0,0466 0,000 0,000 <0,05 Yes 
 
The sample is not normally distributed for any event window which is a criterion 
for using the t-test, the conclusion is therefore based on results of Wilcoxon test. 
Wilcoxon test implies that the difference between positive    ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  and negative    ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  is 
statistically significant for all event windows. Test results reject the null hypothesis of no 
negative abnormal returns following insider sale transaction.   
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The findings summarized in table 1 support the hypothesis that option exercise, followed 
by sale transaction, is associated with negative future average abnormal returns during all 
event windows studied. This result contradicts findings of Carpenter & Remmers (2001) 
who confirm that negative abnormal returns are not significant for their full sample. 
Abody et al. (2008) are also unable to confirm the hypothesis that option exercise 
followed by a sale transaction is associated with negative abnormal return on an 
aggregated level. Both Carpenter & Remmers (2001) and Abody et al. (2008) investigate 
insider option exercises in the United States where option trading is far more extended 
comparing with Sweden, resulting in a significantly larger test sample. A main difference 
between this study and the two studies discussed is that the latter use an event window of 
up to 12 months comparing with one month used in this study. For the shortest event 
window of one month both studies show positive    ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ , contradicting results of this study 
that show negative    ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅   of -4,66% on day 30 (table 1).    
The results are in line with studies examining pure stock sale transactions. Seyhun 
(1986) concludes that insiders sell stocks prior to negative returns. These findings can be 
compared with the study by Iqbal & Shetty (2002) who show that insiders buy stocks 
after stock price decreases and sell after stock price increases in order to exploit 
mispricing. This study is not explicitly considering previous stock performance and the 
possible impact on expected returns. This can be a shortcoming when estimating the 
expected future stock price, due to the fact that a stock may increase significantly during 
the estimation window. If this is the case, the expected returns based on the estimation 
window are not the most proper estimates for future stock performance. The higher 
expected returns, based on previous upward trend in stock price, increase the likelihood 
that the actual returns turn out to be below the expected returns and that the null 
hypothesis is rejected.  
Short-term negative abnormal returns can also be a result of the transaction itself, 
since market participants might believe that insiders are in fact more informed and 
therefore mimic insider´s behavior causing a self-fulfilling negative stock performance.  
In this study the negative abnormal returns continue to increase after 5 days (figure 3) 
when the transaction is observable by outsiders, which can be a result of outsiders 
mimicking insiders’ transaction. However the results show than even after 15 days, when 
the market is assumed to have adjusted stock price to new information, the abnormal 
returns continue to increase. This pattern, suggests that negative    ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  for longer event 
window are not only caused by downward pressure on the stock due to outsiders 
mimicking behavior.  
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Figure 3. 
  Based on results from the full sample, there is a statistically significant stock price 
decrease after insiders sell their shares. This finding suggests that insiders sell their shares 
prior to stock price decrease to avoid wealth decrease. The significant    ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  during the 
shortest event window, when outsiders have no information about the transaction, implies 
that the stock price decrease is not only depressed by possible mimicking behavior by the 
outsiders. It rather suggests that insiders are able to predict stock price decrease and sell 
their shares before this actually occurs. The continuing decrease after 15 day event 
window can have two explanations. One is that insiders do mimick insiders behavior but 
it takes longer time than one month before they adjust the price to the right level. If this is 
the actual case, then market is not semi-strong efficient, which conditions that all new 
available information is priced into a security. Another explanation could be that the 
stock price actually is declining as a result of worsening company performance and 
market adjusts the stock price not necessarily by mimicking the insider transaction but 
revaluing firms future prospects. In either cases, the insider does not experience any 
wealth decrease.     
 
6.2 Subsamples based on firm size 
 
The Swedish stock exchange is as of today subdivided into three different categories 
which are large cap, mid cap and small cap. Of the 112 firms analyzed, 24 firms are listed 
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on large cap, 30 on mid cap and 58 on small cap (relative numbers are presented in figure 
4).   
 
Figure 4. 
Higher number of smaller firms might be explained by the fact that larger firms are 
more observed by the investors and hence insiders in these firms can be more restricted to 
sell their shares. A stock sale transaction can be interpreted as negative signal about 
firm´s future prospects by investors. Since larger firms are followed by many investors 
the signal from sale transaction can decrease firm value by putting downward pressure on 
stock price. This reasoning is in line with findings of Tavakoli et al. (2011), that insider 
trades cause stock reactions. To avoid this causality the insiders in larger corporations 
might keep their shares after option exercise in order to avoid negative signalling. The 
signalling effect of insider actions is supported by the findings of Del Brio & de Miguel 
(2010).  
For firms listed on large cap, results for 5 and 15 day event window are not 
statistically significant for both the t-test and the Wilcoxon test and therefore the null 
hypothesis for large cap firms cannot be rejected for these event windows (table 2). For 
the longest event window, the null hypothesis for large cap firms is rejected.    ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  for 
both mid cap and small cap firms are significant for all of the three event windows and 
the null hypothesis is rejected. Figure 5 plots the daily    ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅   for large cap, mid cap and 
small cap. 
 
 
 
21% 
27% 
52% 
Full sample size distribution 
Large Cap Mid Cap Small Cap
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Table 2.        ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  by firm size       
      Event window    ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  p value t-statitics p value Wilcoxon Normality test H0 Rejected 
      
  
Large Cap 
   
5 days 0,0007 0,425 0,394 <0,05 No 
15 days -0,0058 0,056 0,094 >0,05 No 
30 days -0,0215 0,006 0,015 >0,05 Yes 
      
  
Mid Cap 
   5 days -0,0097 0,050 0,000 <0,05 Yes 
15 days -0,0358 0,000 0,000 >0,05 Yes 
30 days -0,0447 0,001 0,000 <0,05 Yes 
      
  
Small Cap 
   5 days -0,0242 0,002 0,011 <0,05 Yes 
15 days -0,0464 0,001 0,000 <0,05 Yes 
30 days -0,0805 0,000 0,000 <0,05 Yes 
 
   
Figure 5. 
 
The result that the    ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  is statistically significant for large cap firms on day 30 is 
not in line with conclusions of Carpenter & Remmers (2001). Their study finds no 
significant abnormal returns for large firms, arguing it is because large firms provide 
more information and thereby decrease information asymmetry. The market is better at 
assessing value of large firms due to continuous information stream, which in turn 
reduces insiders´ ability to exploit their informational advantage.  Possible explanation 
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for the insignificant results for 5 and 15 day event window could be that the longest event 
window captures other corporate events that affect stock prices.  
The results of the study show that negative abnormal returns are largest after insider 
sale transactions in small cap firms. Negative returns are significant for all event windows 
and    ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅   30 days after the sale transaction are as high as 8 %. This rapid decrease can 
have several explanations. Firstly, shares in small cap firms can be concentrated among 
few large shareholders. When an insider sells large amount of shares, the stock can 
decline since large sale transaction depresses the stock price. Secondly, small firms 
presumably suffer from higher information asymmetry, which results in sale transaction 
being a stronger signal. When information stream from small firms is not continuous, 
investors are interpreting the sale transaction as a negative signal about firm´s future 
prospect and sell their shares, thereby depressing the stock price. Thirdly, as discussed in 
articles by Lakonishok & Lee (2001), Hotson et al. (2008) and Seyhun (1986), insiders in 
smaller firms are more involved in the overall business and therefore possess more 
valuable information that can be exploited. The informational advantage makes it easier 
to predict stock performance and in turn avoid wealth decrease.  
For firms listed on mid cap, the results show similar returns as for smaller firms, 
although negative    ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  are not as high. During the shortest event windows, stock declines 
with 1%, but negative returns increase to 3,6 % after 15 trading days. The transaction in 
itself might thus trigger stock decrease after day 5 when outsiders can observe the 
transaction. 
Analyzing table 2,    ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅   for longest event window of 30 days are -2,15% for large 
cap firms compared with -8 % for small cap firms. One of the explanations, suggested by 
Lakonishok & Lee (2001) is that large firms are more monitored and thereby insiders in 
large firms are discouraged from undertaking any illegal actions. Large firms attract more 
publicity so there is higher probability that the illegal transaction will be discovered.   
The results from subsamples based on firm size, supports the findings of previous 
studies that insiders in smaller firms have better ability to exploit the insider information.  
Moreover, this relationship seems to be characteristic for several countries; Carpenter & 
Remmers (2001) and Lakonishok & Lee (2001) support this finding based on US data, 
Hotson et al. (2008) conclude the same relationship based on Australian stock market.   
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6.3 Subsamples based on date for exercise and sale transaction 
 
Of the 354 transactions analyzed, 160 option exercises are associated with immediate sale 
of the company´s shares, i.e. the option exercise date was the same as the date for sale 
transaction. This subdivision assumes that option exercise followed by immediate sale is 
associated with higher negative abnormal returns, thus insiders’ want to take rapid actions 
to avoid wealth decrease. If the option is not tradable, the only way for insiders to exit 
their position based on negative information is to exercise the option and sell the obtained 
shares. Table 3 summarizes results for the samples with immediate sale and sale of shares 
after the option exercise date.  
 
 
 
Figure 6. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3.        ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ by event date       
      Event window    ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  p value t-statitics p value Wilcoxon Normality test H0 Rejected 
      
  
Immediate sale 
   5 days -0,0065 0,084 0,280 <0,05 No 
15 days -0,0240 0,002 0,000 <0,05 Yes 
30 days -0,0399 0,000 0,000 <0,05 Yes 
      
  
Not immediate sale 
   5 days -0,0125 0,006 0,001 <0,05 Yes 
15 days -0,0336 0,000 0,000 <0,05 Yes 
30 days -0,0513 0,000 0,000 <0,05 Yes 
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The results show that option exercise followed by immediate sale is associated with 
higher negative    ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  (-4%) for the 30 day event window compared to transactions that 
occurred after one day (-5%). Moreover the shortest event window for immediate sale 
transactions does not result in statistically significant    ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ . The results do not support the 
assumption that immediate sale is associated with larger negative abnormal returns, 
however in both transaction types insiders avoid wealth decrease by selling the shares. 
The immediate sale can have lower signalling effect, because investors see a combined 
transaction on one day i.e. both exercise transaction and sale transaction appear on the 
same day. If insider exercises the option and sells the shares immediately, then the sale 
transaction can be perceived as insider´s need for liquidity or willingness to diversify. 
However if the sale transaction is made later, the transaction is seen in isolation and 
perceived as a signal of negative firm prospects. Immediate sale is thus less likely to be 
mimicked by investors and affect stock price. 
 
6.4 Subsamples based on insider position 
 
Figure 7 summarizes share of transactions made by respective insider category as 
published by the Swedish Financial Supervisory Authority.  The analysis is subdivided 
into higher-ranked insiders and lower-ranked insiders, the former consists of transactions 
made by CEOs, vice CEOs and board members in parent company and the latter sample 
consist of remaining insiders.  
 
Figure 7. 
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Table 4 presents the results for statistical tests for the two samples. Null hypothesis for 
higher-ranked managers cannot be rejected for 5 and 15 day estimation window. For 
lower-ranked insiders the tests show significant abnormal returns for all three event 
windows. 
 
 
T 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 8 
 
The subdivision into insider position is based on the assumption that higher-ranked 
insiders possess more valuable information compared to lower-ranked insiders. 
Accordingly, higher-ranked executives should be able to benefit the most from timing 
their option exercise and avoid larger wealth decrease. Findings in table 4 do not support 
this assumption, since    ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅    for day 30 are larger for lower-ranked insiders (-5,3%) 
Table 4.          ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  by insider position     
      Event window    ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  p value t-statitics p value Wilcoxon Normality test H0 Rejected 
      
   
Higher -ranked insiders 
  
5 days -0,0063 0,187 0,473 <0,05 No 
15 days -0,0266 0,016 0,120 <0,05 No 
30 days -0,0318 0,035 0,007 <0,05 Yes 
      
   
Lower-ranked insiders 
  5 days -0,0115 0,001 0,000 <0,05 Yes 
15 days -0,0309 0,000 0,000 <0,05 Yes 
30 days -0,0530 0,000 0,000 <0,05 Yes 
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compared with higher-ranked insiders (-3,2%). Both insider classes avoid wealth decrease 
during the 30 days after the stock sale transaction. These results are not in line with 
previous findings by Seyhun (1986) and Carpenter & Remmers (2001) who show that 
higher-ranked managers are better at predicting stock prices since they have more 
information about the company. The fact that    ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  for 30 day event window are lower for 
higher-ranked insiders can have several explanations. One explanation can be that actions 
by higher-ranked managers are more monitored by investors, which makes it more risky 
to exploit information. Another explanation can be that it presumably is more important 
to align goals of higher-ranked managers by tying their wealth to the company. This can 
be achieved by constraining higher-ranked insiders’ possibilities to sell shares after 
exercising their options. Lower-ranked insiders may not be constrained to sell shares, thus 
enabling them to exploit their informational advantage to a larger extent and consequently 
avoid wealth decrease.    
Insignificance of the abnormal returns after stock sale by higher-ranked insiders can 
be explained by their need to diversify. Since higher-ranked managers have more of their 
wealth tied to a company, the shares obtained from option exercise are sold to decrease 
risk of wealth decrease and not necessarily to exploit insider information. 
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Chapter 7 – Conclusion 
 
The final chapter concludes the study based on the empirical findings and the analysis, 
chapter concludes with suggestions for future studies. 
 
The study provides new evidence of insiders’ ability to utilize their informational 
advantage, which confirms the general findings of previous studies on Swedish stock 
market. The findings reject the efficient market hypothesis in its strongest form. 
On aggregated level, the insiders are able to predict stock price and sell their shares 
before the decline in stock price. The stock sale transactions examined in this study are 
preceded by option exercises, which suggest that the option exercises and consequent 
stock sales are timed to avoid wealth decrease. Stock sales after option exercises can be 
assumed to have less informational content because outsiders might interpret it as part of 
insiders’ compensation. This study shows that option exercise with consequent sale of 
shares can convey important information about future stock price performance. Contrary 
to an assumption that insiders sale transactions is not informative because insiders have 
many reasons to sell the shares, this study provides support for the fact that insiders seem 
to know when to sell their shares.  
Higher-ranked managers seem to be worse at predicting future stock price although 
they have presumably more information about the firm. The result is contradicting 
empirical findings from international studies. This finding can be a result of efficient 
monitoring mechanism in Swedish financial markets. Since higher ranked managers are 
more monitored they can be reluctant to exploit their informational advantage and risk 
regulatory actions. On the contrary, this implies that lower-ranked insiders are less 
monitored and get to exploit their informational advantage. 
Insiders in smaller firms seem to be better at utilizing their informational 
advantage, which is in line with findings of similar international studies. The higher stock 
price decrease after insider sales in smaller firms can have an alternative explanation 
derived from signalling hypothesis. Smaller firms suffer from more severe information 
asymmetries which results in sale transaction being stronger signal about firm´s future 
prospects. The signalling effect can thus decrease stock price if outsiders interpret it as 
bad news and put downward pressure on stock price. 
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Sale of shares immediately after the option exercise is not a signal of more severe stock 
decline than shares sold later during a month consequent to the option exercise. The 
implication of this finding is that insiders want to diversify immediately after they 
exercise their options and the stock sale in itself is not caused by negative information 
about future stock price.  
 
A suggestion for further research could naturally be to analyze post-exercise stock 
performance for insiders who keep their shares. International studies have concluded that 
insiders who keep their shares after option exercise experience positive abnormal returns.  
Another suggestion is to analyze the relationship between option exercise and insiders´ 
private wealth or risk exposure to determine motives behind option exercise decisions.   
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Appendix 1 
 
OMX Stockholm Small Cap Price Index (OMX S SCPI) 
Index representing the bottom 20% of the shares based on market capitalization. The index is 
reviewed semiannually to ensure that only the bottom 20% of shares is included in the index. 
Price index implies that cash dividends are not reinvested in the index. Thereby the price 
return index only yields performance of stock price movements. Index is adjusted for 
corporate actions (splits, reversed splits, new shares issues etc.) 
OMX Stockholm Mid Cap Price Index (OMX S MCPI) 
Index representing all shares listed on OMX Stockholm Mid Cap, which contains firms with 
market capitalization of between 150 and 1000 million euro. Dividends are not reinvested in 
the index. Index is adjusted for corporate actions (splits, reversed splits, new shares issues 
etc.) 
OMX Stockholm 30 Price Index (OMX S 30 PI) 
Index comprised of 30 most traded shares. Cash dividends are not reinvested in the index. 
Index is adjusted for corporate actions (splits, reversed splits, new shares issues etc.) 
OMX Stockholm Benchmark Price Index (OMX SBPI) 
Index representing 80 to 100 largest and most traded stocks on Stockholm stock exchange. 
Cash dividends are not reinvested in the index. Index is adjusted for corporate actions (splits, 
reversed splits, new shares issues etc.) 
Carnegie Sweden Small Cap Price Index (CSX PI) 
Index representing performance of “smaller” companies listed on Stockholm stock exchange. 
Definition of “smaller” companies is revised annually by taking into account total 
capitalization of Carnegie Nordic Total Index. Index is adjusted for cash dividends so that 
performance of the index reflects stock price performance. Index is adjusted for corporate 
actions (splits, reversed splits, new shares issues etc.) 
Source: 
http://www.carnegie.se/sv/foretag/Kurser--index/Carnegie-Nordic-Ind-X/Viktningsrapporter/Indexaktie/ 
http://omxnordicexchange.com/produkter/index/OMX_index/OMXS_Local_Index/  
https://indexes.nasdaqomx.com/docs/Methodology_NASDAQ_OMX_and_Oslo_Bors_Equity_Indexes.pdf 
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Appendix 2 
Firms represented in the study 
Academedia Hemtex Ratos 
Acando HiQ International Raysearch Laboratories 
Active Biotech HMS Networks Riddarhyttan Resources 
Addnode HQ Sagax 
Addtech Human Care Sandvik 
Anoto Group Höganäs Sanmina Kista 
Aspiro IBS Sapa 
Atlas Copco Intrum Justitia Scania 
Atrium Ljungberg Invik & Co Scanmining 
Avanza Bank Holding Jeeves Information Systems Semcon 
Axfood Karlshamns Sensys Traffic 
B&B Tools Kipling Holding Shelton Petroleum 
Bilia Klövern Sigma 
Billerud KMT Group Skandinaviska Enskilda Banken 
Biosensor Applications Know It SKF 
Sweden Lagercrantz Group Song Networks Holding 
Björn Borg Lindex Sotkamo Silver 
Boss Media Lundin Mining Corporation Starbreeze 
BTS Group M2S Sverige Strand Interconnect 
Capio Meda Svenska Cellulosa 
Cision Melker Schörling Tanganyika Oil Company 
Consilium Midsona Technology Nexus 
Countermine Tecknologies Modern Times Group Tele 2 
Custos Multiq Teleca 
Cybercom Group NCC Telefon AB L M Ericsson 
D. Carnegie & Co Net Insight Telelogic 
DGC One Netonnet Teligent 
Diamyd Medical New Wave Group TMG International 
Electrolux Nobia Trelleborg 
Elekta Nordea Bank Trio 
Europolitan Vodafone Nordic Service Partners Holding Turnit 
Firefly Nordnet Uniflex 
Frango Obducat Utfors 
Gambro OEM International Volvo 
Geveko PA Resources Vostok Gas 
Glocalnet Prevas Zodiak Television 
Guideline Technology Pricer 
 Gunnebo Protect Data 
  
